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OPENING THE PANDORA'S Box:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME CouRT's DECISION IN

S.B.P. v. PATEL ENGINEERING 1
O.P. Malhotra*
Criticizing the controversialSupreme Court ruling that the power of
the court to appoint an arbitratoris a judicialpower, the author
believes that the decision is an incorrect reading of section n1 of the
Arbitration and ConciliationAct, 1996 and amounts to judicial
legislation. This ruling amplifies the need for judicial and legislative
clarification on the power of the court to appoint an arbitrator,so
as to fulfil the objectives of the Arbitration and ConciliationAct.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a momentous Seven Judge Constitution Bench decision in SBP v. Patel
Engineering Ltd.2 the Supreme Court has clarified and explained the operation of
section tt(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [hereinafter the "Act"]
dealing with the appointment of arbitrators by the Chief Justice. The Court
explained that such an appointment is an exercise of judicial power and not an
administrative decision. This has far-reaching consequences for the future conduct
of arbitral proceedings in India and more importantly for the signal that this

A.IR. 2oo6 S.C. 450.
Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London; Senior Advocate, Supreme
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sends out about the scope of judicial interference in alternative methods of dispute
resolution.
Numerous commentators have criticized the decision in SBP v. Patel
EngineeringLtd. as going beyond the expected role of a judicial forum in a party
chosen dispute resolution mechanism. Be that as it may, it is submitted that this
case raises a more fundamental concern, a concern that has been overlooked in
the diatribe against judicial interference in arbitration. More significantly, it is to
be rued that the decision has virtually re-written the statutory language in section
11(6). In a legal system that prides itself on a rule of law premised upon a tripartite
system of governance, this decision goes way beyond the intention of the
legislature that was clearly discernable in the express words of the statute. This
has opened a Pandora's box. It is in this context that the article analyses the farreaching implications of this decision.
Part II of this article discusses the relevant legal provisions and the earlier
case law relating to the default powers of the Chief Justice, thus setting the stage
for understanding the decision of the Supreme Court. Part III examines this decision
of the Supreme Court in detail and discusses both the majority opinion as well as
the dissent. Part IV advances arguments disagreeing with the decision. It lays
down the proper role of the Court keeping in view the true spirit of the UNCITRAL
Model Law [hereinafter the 'Model Law'] and the underlying grundnorm of

legislative supremacy.

I.

SETrING THE STAGE - BACKGROUND

The Act, under section 12(2), provides full freedom to the parties to agree
upon a procedure for the appointment of the arbitrator(s). Usually, the parties
provide for the appointment of a named arbitrator, or in the case of an institutional
arbitration, a designee institution. If such procedure for appointment of the
arbitrators is left for future agreement between the parties, it is not uncommon
that for frustrating the arbitration, one of the parties refuses to appoint an
arbitrator. Similarly, it is not hard to imagine situations where both the partyappointed arbitrators are unable to reach any agreement as to their choice of a
common third arbitrator. In such situations, where the parties are not able to
agree on the procedure, or the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the third
arbitrator, or the designee institution is unable to perform its functions related to
the procedure of appointment of the arbitral tribunal, section 11(6) of the Act
provides,
.in the absence of any other means for securing the appointment

provided in the agreement on the appointment procedure, [such]
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appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief
Justice or any person or institution designated by him.

The next sub-section further provides
[this] decision of the Chief Justice or any person or institution
designated by him shall be final.
Thus to appoint or secure appointment of the sole arbitrator or the third
arbitrator, the default power under all these provisions vests in the Chief Justice
or any person or institution designated by him. The pertinent questions therefore
are: What is the nature of this function? Is it judicial? Is it administrative or neither?
Or is it a statutory power? The Supreme Court has been vexed with these questions
since the enactment of the Act.
The decision of the Supreme Court in KR Raveendranathanv. State of
Kerala3 may be taken as a convenient starting point. A two Judge Bench of the
Court referred to a larger Bench the question "whether the function of the Chief
Justice or his designate, under sub-sections (4), (5) and (6), of section ii to appoint
an arbitrator or to secure the appointment of an arbitrator is of a judicial nature."
Subsequently another two Judge Bench of the Court referred the same question
to a larger Bench." Later in Sundaran Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd., another
two Judge Bench of the court, as obiter, stated that "under the 1996 Act,
appointment of arbitrator(s) is made as per the provisions of section ii, which
does not require the Court (sic, actually Chief Justice) to pass a judicial order
appointing [the] arbitrator(s)." This obiter was affirmed by another two Judge
Bench in Ador Sarnia Put Ltd. v. Peekay Holdings Ltd.5 which was affirmed by a
three Judge Bench in Konkan Railways Corpn v. Mehul Construction Co. 6 The
latter decision too was referred to a larger Bench by another two Judge Bench in
Konkan Railway Corporation v. Rani Construction (P)Ltd."
This is how the matter came up before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court. The Court cleared the air with a unanimous decision reported in Konkan
Railway Corpn Ltd. v. Rani ConstructionPut Ltd.8 where it affirmed the ruling in

3 (1996) 10 S.C.C. 35.
4

(1998) 9 S.C.C. 728.

5 (1998) B S.C.C. 572.
6 (2000) 7 S.C.C. 201.
7 (20oo) 8 S.C.C. 159.
* (2002) 2 S.C.C. 388 (405), per Bharucha C.J. affirming the three judge bench
decision in Konkan Railway Corp Ltd. v. Mehul Construction Co., (2000) 7 S.C.C.
201.
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Mahul Construction Co. The Supreme Court ruled that the default power of the
Chief Justice or 'any person or institution' designated by him under section 11 is
not adjudicatory. On review of its earlier dicta the Court said that the only function
of the Chief Justice or his designate under section 11 is to "fill the gap left" and
appoint an arbitrator, so that the arbitral tribunal is expeditiously constituted
and the arbitration proceedings are commenced. This function, according to the
Court, has been advisedly left to the Chief Justice or his designate with a view to
ensure that the appointment of the arbitrator is made by a person occupying a
high judicial office to instill confidence in the appointment process. This would
ensure that due care is taken to see that a competent, independent, and impartial
arbitrator is appointed. Further, since the Chief Justice or his designate exercising
the default power to appoint arbitrators is not a tribunal, therefore, such a decision
cannot be made the subject of a petition for special leave to appeal under Article
136 of the Constitution.

III.

CHARTING

NEw

TERRITORY -

SBP v. PATEL

ENGINEERING
The Supreme Court in SBP & Co v. Patel EngineeringLtd. through a six-toone majority has overturned the decision of the Constitution Bench in Rani
Construction.9
Speaking through Balasubramanyan J, the Supreme Court held in no
uncertain terms that the "the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High
Court or the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) of the Act is not an
administrative power. It is a judicial power." The implication of this is that the
Court will appoint an arbitrator only if it satisfies itself that all the conditions
precedent to the initiation of arbitration proceedings exist. Thus, it must go into
the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement, the maintainability and
arbitrability of the claim, the qualifications of the arbitrators and other
jurisdictional matters. To rationalize this holding of the Court with the power of
the arbitral tribunal to decide on its own jurisdiction in section 16, the Court was
forced into a situation where it had to concede that the rule of kompetenzkompetenz will operate only in respect of those arbitrations, where an arbitrator
has not been appointed by the Court.
The other bit of "strained" construction which results from this decision is
that the words in section 11(6) allowing for the Chief Justice or "any person or
institution designated by him" to appoint an arbitrator, have been severely
9(zoos) 8 S.C.C. 618.
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mutilated. The words disclose a clear delegation. Surely, the legislature would
have been aware that a judicial power cannot be delegated. To overcome this
argument, the Supreme Court has held that here an "institution" can only mean a
judge of the Supreme Court or any High Court.
Flowing from this conclusion arrived at by the Court are two very serious
problems.
A. It Creates an Absurdity in the Law
The conclusion reached by the Court is something not envisaged within
the scheme of the Act at all. To illustrate, even under section 45 of the Act, where
the power of review of the arbitration agreement is given to the Court in specific
terms,'0 the Court can only conduct a prima facie examination of the documents
and materials on record. To do otherwise will defeat the power of kompetenzkompetenz under section 16 of the Act, lead to prolonged proceedings at the
initial stage, as well as increase costs and uncertainty for the parties concerned.
Section 11(6) by using the phrases "Chief Justice" and "appoint" describes
this action of the Chief Justice, in terms indicating an even lesser degree of
permissible intervention than section 45. Thus, at the very least, the same logic
under section 45, applies to the case at hand. Section ii merely provides for the
"procedure" for the appointment of the arbitrators. Surely, the procedure adopted
should not affect the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to determine the validity
of the arbitration agreement. This decision creates an absurdity in the law to that
extent.
This also has serious consequences for the working of the arbitration system
in India. It gives an incentive to the parties to indulge in dilatory tactics since a
primafacie examination of an arbitration agreement can be done at one hearing,
as opposed to a complete judicial adjudication, which may take several months.
The jurisprudence of arbitration worldwide1 is unanimous in rejecting the right
O

§ 45 deals with the power of judicial authorities to refer the parties to arbitration. It
provides "Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of a9oS), a judicial authority, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in § 44,
shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under
him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed."

2

Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd., 2005 (3) Arb. L.R. 1 (SC).
It is only fair to point out that contradictory viewpoints do exist on whether a court
should rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement. For instance in England,
the power of the court while appointing an arbitral tribunal is recognized as 'judicial'
as per § 18 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. However, this is so because the nature of the
73

VOL. 19(2)

Student Bar Review

2oo7

of courts to interfere in the working of the arbitral process. 3 It can be put no
better than the words of Lord Mustill who mused - "How much more reticence
may be required when the parties have agreed that their disputes shall be resolved
elsewhere?"I4

B. It is an Exercise of "JudicialLegislation"
Be that as it may, the other regrettable and even more serious consequence
of this decision is that in arriving at this conclusion the Court has strained the
legislative language beyond permissible limits.
It is relevant to note here that the Parliament has departed from the text of
Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which vests the default power to appoint
an arbitrator in the 'court'. The default power has specifically been vested by the
Parliament in the 'Chief Justice' and to designate 'any person or institution'. This
function was deliberately entrusted to the Chief Justice to ensure that the
appointment is made by a person occupying the highest judicial office.
The fact that the Chief Justice is authorized to delegate his default power to
appoint arbitrators to 'any person or institution' clearly indicates that this function
is not a judicial function, because a judicial function cannot be delegated by the
Chief Justice to 'any person or institution'.
Furthermore, the right to appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators basically is
the right of the parties. If the parties fail to agree upon the appointment of an
arbitrator or the party-nominated arbitrators fail to appoint the third arbitrator,
the right by default passes to the Chief Justice, who is authorized by the statute to
delegate his function to appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators to 'any person or
institution'. The phrase 'any person or institution' is of wide amplitude. It cannot
be tampered with by a judicial fiat.

power has been specifically so prescribed by the English Arbitration Act, 1996. The
Indian Parliament has specifically excluded this power from the courts at the initial

'3

stage and placed the power solely with the arbitral tribunal in consonance with the
principle of kompetenz-kompetenz.
Article 5 of UNCITRAL Model Law. See also "United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration",
(1985) 24 I.L.M. 1302, 1331; O.P.C. Farms Inc. v. Conopco Inc., 154 F-3d 1047 (9th
Cir. 1998); Private Company 'Triple V' Inc. Ltd. v. Star (Universal) Co. Ltd. and Sky

Jade Enterprises Group Ltd., Case No.

1og,

CLOUT (Hong Kong Court of Appeal, 7h

July, 1995); Pacific International Lines (Pte) Ltd v. Tsinliens Metals and Minerals
Co (HK) Ltd., 11993] 2 H.K.L.R. 249.
'4

Lord Mustill in the foreword to 0. P. MIALoTRA, Tha LAw AND PRAce or AtrnAnoN Vili
(2006).
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The majority opinion purports to change the language of the statute by
replacing the words "the appointment shall be made... by the Chief Justice or any
person or institution designated by him" with the court coined languageThe power under Section 11(6) of the Act, in its entirety, could be
delegated, by the Chief Justice of the High Court only to another
Judge of that Court and by the Chief Justice of India to another Judge
of the Supreme Court.
It is submitted that this clearly goes beyond the delicate balance between
the legislature and judiciary, for "it is for the Legislature to make a law applicable
to certain situations contemplated by it and the judiciary has no power in entering
into legislative wisdom."'5 While interpreting statutory provisions, it is not
permissible for the court to replace the words of the statute with some other
words. The Court cannot restrain or expand the operation of the legislation since
"it has no power to legislate.l',
The minority opinion recognizes this fact, and Thakker J minces no words
when he says No court of law much less the highest court of the country would
interpret one provision of an Act of Parliament which would make
another provision totally redundant, otiose and nugatory... It is not
open to a court to ignore the legislative mandate by making artificial
distinction between the power to be exercised by the Chief Justice or
by his 'colleague' and the power to be exercised by other organs
though legislature was quite clear on the exercise of power by the
persons and authorities spnecified therein.
Rewriting the statute in the court-coined language is tantamount to
impermissible judicial legislation. Though this decision, for the time being does
prevail, its jurisprudential correctness is not free from doubt because it is nothing
but a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of
interpretation."7 If this holding is to prevail, the court will be acting in a legislative
rather than a judicial capacity. 8 While purporting to interpret various enactments,
's
"

is

Per Thakker J, supra note 1, 111.
State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese, (1986) 4 S.C.C. 746 (749). See also Union of
India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 (Supp.) S.C.C. 323; Crawford v. Spooner,
[1846] 4 Moo Ind App 179 (P.C.).
Magor & St Mellons RDC v. Newport Corpn, [19511 2 All. E.R. 839 (841) (HL).
Petron Engineering Construction Pvt Ltd v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, 1989
(Supp.) a S.C.C. 7. See also Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 3
SAJ.C. 533; Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd v. UP Financial Corporation,
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this seven-judge decision is set to become a precedent for impermissible
intervention in areas where the Parliament has been quite clear and unambiguous.
This militates against the tripartite theory of the government.

IV. LAw REFORM - THE WAY FORWARD
In the light of these principles universally recognised by the English as well
as Indian courts, the conclusions of the majority judgment in Patel Engineering
are fundamentally flawed. The decision requires reconsideration by a still larger
Bench of the Court. But even then the possibility of judicial division cannot be
ruled out ad infinitum. It is, therefore, suggested that the Chief Justice of India
may consider the advisability of recommending the issue to Parliament for a
suitable amendment. A somewhat similar situation arose in Associated Cement
Cos. Ltd. v. Their Workmen," where a strong case was made before the Supreme
Court for revision of the Full Bench Formula for payment of bonus. Rejecting the
plea for revision of the formula, speaking for the court, Gajendragadkar J. stated:
The plea for the revision of the formula raises an issue which affects
all industries; and before any change is made in it, all industries and
their workmen would have to be heard and their pleas carefully
considered. It is obvious that, while dealing with the present group
of appeals, it would be difficult, unreasonable, and inexpedient to
attempt such a task.... If the Legislature feels that the claim for social
and economic justice made by labour should be redefined on a clearer
basis, it can step in and legislate in that behalf.
This resulted in enactment of the Bonus Act 1965. Likewise, the Supreme
Court may recommend to the Parliament the need for amending section 11 by a
legislative measure. This need is underscored by the fact that the operation of this
decision and its prescribed procedure in arbitrations in India today not only
serves as a hindrance to expeditious proceedings but sends out the wrong signal
to parties keen on seeking alternate methods of dispute resolution. At a time
when the trend worldwide points towards reduction of judicial interference, the
Supreme Court has in PatelEngineeringcharted the opposite course, an approach
not justified in principle as well as practice. It may, however, be borne in mind
that as long as this decision is not overruled by a larger Bench or by a legislative
amendment clarifying the law, it will prevail and the procedure prescribed in it
has to be followed.
(2003) 2 SC.C 455; Shiv Shakti Co-op Housing Society Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers,
A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 2434.

'(1959) 1 L.L.J. 644.
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